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Abstract 
On February 2007, a massive fire in a propane de-asphalting unit in an oil refinery in Texas, USA 
happened due to liquid propane release from a cracked pipe in a control station injuring four people, 
damaging extensive equipment, causing significant business interruption, and resulting in more than 
$50 million losses. The accident was triggered by a natural hazard: freezing of piping at a control station 
caused an inlet pipe elbow to crack, which in turn, led to the release of high-pressure liquid propane 
which was rapidly ignited. In addition, there were two near-miss events due to potential domino effects. 
In fact, the accident could reasonably have resulted in much more severe consequences due to the 
exposure of large butane storage spheres and chlorine containers, increasing the possibility of a 
catastrophic domino effect. This paper develops a Natech (natural hazard triggering technological 
disasters) risk assessment methodology that relies upon Bayesian network capabilities and takes into 
account the potential Natech domino effects. The methodology is implemented in the intended refinery 
and mathematically graphically represents the dynamic cause–effect relations between units involved 
in the scenario, and handles uncertainties among the interactions. In addition, the methodology can 
provide a risk value for the entire scenario that can be used further for risk-based decision making. 
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1. Introduction 
On Friday 16 February 2007, workers at Valero Refinery in Sunray, Texas, USA witnessed a high-
pressure liquid propane release in a propane de-asphalting (PDA) unit. The propane vapour immediately 
ignited and injured three employees who were seriously burned, and one fire fighter with minor burn. 
                                                     
1 Corresponding author, Tel: +61 2 9514 2644 
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The unit piping and equipment were extensively damaged and a major pipe rack nearby collapsed due 
to the impingement of subsequent jet fire. Adjacent units including four liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
storage tanks and three chlorine (a highly toxic gas) storage cylinders were seriously threatened by the 
primary fire. High and shifting winds and the rapid spread of the fire hampered fire-fighting efforts. 
Due to serious consequences, the plant was completely shut down for two months and had to operate 
for one year with reduced capacity. According to the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation 
report (CSB, 2008), the propane release likely happened because of a high-pressure piping failure due 
to freezing of a control station which had not been in service for approximately 15 years. The control 
station had been neither completely isolated from the process vessel nor freeze-protected, forming a 
dead-leg. During cold weather prior to the accident, accumulated water in a pipe elbow of the control 
station became frozen and cracked the pipe elbow. On the day of the accident, when the air temperature 
rose, the ice melted and allowed the release of 4,500 pounds per minute of liquid propane from the 
failed pipe. The propane vapour travelled in wind direction and found an ignition source probably in 
the boiler house, leading to a flash fire and subsequent jet fires and fire balls. Direct losses of the 
accident were estimated more than $50 million (CSB, 2008). The fire could have created a worse 
industrial process accident due to the possibility of domino effects. 
The event at Valero Refinery  is just one example of industrial accidents triggered by natural hazards 
that nowadays are referred to as “Natech” and are considered as an emerging risk which is likely to be 
exacerbated by ongoing climate change and growing industrialization (Krausmann et al., 2011). All 
over the world, Natech accidents occur in the wake of natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, 
volcanos, and severe weather, resulting in hazardous substances release leading to human fatalities and 
injuries, environmental pollution, and economic losses. Some examples among others are the 
Fukushima power station disaster after the Tohoku earthquake in 2011 (Morino et al., 2011), the fire in 
a major refinery in Turkey during the Kocaeli earthquake in 1999 (Steinberg and Cruz, 2004), the 
release of hazardous materials due to the Asian tsunami in 2004, and the ignition of eight tanks due to 
lightning during a rainstorm in 1994 in Egypt (Renni et al., 2010).  
Natechs are even able to create worse consequences due to domino effects (Cozzani et al., 2014) in 
which a primary accident starting in a  unit spreads to adjacent units, causing secondary accidents the 
total consequence of which could be much more severe than the primary event. Therefore, effective 
methodologies are required to model and assess Natech risk and evaluate the effectiveness of 
corresponding safety policies. Currently, there are a number of regulations for building industrial plant 
structures to resist natural hazards up to the design-level event (Cruz and Okada, 2008). In addition, 
there are few laws to ensure that the correct emergency responses are conducted during natural hazards 
concerning the performance of non-structural elements and safety measures (Girgin and Krausmann, 
2013). It is worth noting that the releases of chemicals triggered by natural hazards are not always 
because of structural failures. They can also happen because of the failure of back-up or safety systems 
that are installed to prevent such accidents in the first place (Cruz and Okada, 2008). In addition, current 
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Natech risk analysis methodologies are limited only to some guidance for industry and authorities on 
how to assess risk (Krausmann et al., 2011). All of these highlight the importance of new methodology 
development to assist industry in dealing with Natechs (Cozzani et al., 2014; Landucci et al., 2014; 
Necci et al., 2016). Therefore, this paper is aimed at demonstrating the importance of considering the 
role of Natechs in modelling and risk assessment of domino effects. 
The rest of this paper has been organized as follow: Section 2 presents the fundamental backgrounds of 
Natechs, domino effects, and BNs; the methodology is developed in Section 3 while its demonstration 
to Valero case study is presented in Section 4; conclusions are presented in Section 5.  
2. Background 
2.1. Natech hazards 
Natechs are referred to accidents in which the natural world and technological plants collide, leading to 
explosions, fires or the release of hazardous materials. Natechs often produce severe consequences as 
proven by past Natechs,  affecting people, properties and the environment (El Hajj et al., 2015). Natural 
hazards can be categorised into four groups including geological, meteorological, hydrological, and 
climatic. Each category includes a number of hazards as presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Natural hazard categories (Girgin and Krausmann, 2016). 
Geological Meteorological Hydrological Climatic 
Earthquake 
Landslide 
Subsidence 
Frost heave 
Other geological 
Heavy rainfall 
Tropical cyclone 
Storm 
Winter storm 
High wind 
Tornado 
Lightning 
Flood 
Stream erosion 
Hot weather 
Cold weather 
Freeze 
Drought 
A recent investigation has identified 347 Natechs from 1986 to 2012 in the US pipeline network used 
for transferring hazardous liquids such as crude oil, refined petroleum products and other highly volatile 
liquids. Among these Natechs, 76 accidents (i.e. 21%) are attributed to freeze-triggered accidents which 
are in the focus of this paper (Girgin and Krausmann, 2016). 
2.2. Natech legal frameworks 
In many countries, there are frameworks and programs for major accidents prevention and mitigation. 
However, only a few countries have taken steps to prevent or prepare for Natech disasters. This section 
reviews the current Natech risk management practices in the United States, Europe, and Japan:  
• In the US, two regulations including the process safety management (PSM) regulation and risk 
management plan (RMP) rule are playing the major role in preventing major industrial 
accidents. According to these requirements, industries need to carry out the process safety 
analysis, maintain the process safety information, evaluate the current mitigation measures and 
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standards, and develop training and maintenance programs. In addition, human, health and the 
environment are protected through the emergency response programs by considering safety 
measures and introducing procedures for notifying the public and local agencies. However, 
natural hazards are not explicitly considered by these regulations, and there are no specific 
provisions in the both regulations to prevent, for instance, domino effects triggered by natural 
disasters. The only legislation in the US which specifically deals with natural hazards is the 
California accidental release prevention (CalARP) program which calls for the risk assessment 
of potential releases due to earthquakes and requires prevention and mitigation measures to 
avoid the release of certain hazardous substances during earthquakes (Cruz and Okada, 2008). 
However, CalARP does not take into account the possibility of Natech-related domino effects 
and the protective role of land use planning. 
• In Europe, the Seveso III Directive (2012) plays the main role in preventing chemical accidents. 
Under the Seveso III, industrial facilities which store, use or handle dangerous substances are 
required to set out major-accident prevention policies, to write and submit safety reports, and 
to establish emergency plans to deal with accidental releases of hazardous materials. Seveso III 
mandates the member states to consider the probability of natural disasters in the risk 
assessment of major accident scenarios when preparing safety reports (Article 10), with an 
explicit mention of floods and earthquakes in the Annex II. The most of European countries 
that consider Natechs have thus limited their programs mainly to floods and earthquakes among 
other natural hazards. 
The directive also does not specify any methods or actions to achieve these requirements. 
Compared to the US regulations, however, the Seveso III considers the analysis of potential 
domino effects and  emphasizes the establishment of land-use policies,  both of which are very 
important in addressing Natech risk assessment as domino effects are more likely during natural 
disasters than during normal plant operations (Cruz and Okada, 2008).  
• In Japan, the prevention and management of chemical accidents are regulated by various laws. 
The only regulation explicitly addressing Natech risk is the amended high-pressure gas safety 
(HPGS) law which requires industrial establishments to take all additional measures necessary 
to reduce the accident risk from earthquakes and tsunamis (Krausmann and Baranzini, 2012). 
As can be noted from the foregoing regulations and directives, they usually fall short in addressing the 
Natechs in risk assessment and management studies (e.g., in the US) or have a rather limited scope (e.g., 
in Europe and Japan), ignoring a wide range of other natural disasters with potentially catastrophic 
impacts on industrial plants.    
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2.3. Natech risk analysis 
Due to the specific nature of Natech, its risk has been considered as an emerging risk issue in Europe 
under the iNTeg-Risk program project (Krausmann et al., 2011). There are plenty of risk analysis 
methodologies to assess the risk of conventional industrial accidents during day-to-day operations. 
Recently, there have been some attempts for risk assessment of Natechs triggered by earthquake, flood 
and lighting (Campedel et al., 2008; El Hajj et al., 2015; Landucci et al., 2014; Lanzano et al., 2015; 
Necci et al., 2013).  
For example, Rapid Natech Assessment and Mapping Tool (RAPID-N) has been developed for 
accidents caused by earthquakes, based on the estimation of on-site natural hazard parameters, 
determination of damage probabilities of units, and assessment of probability and severity of possible 
consequences (Girgin and Krausmann, 2013). RAPID-N, however, is merely applicable to earthquakes. 
Antonioni et al. (2009) have extended the standard quantitative risk assessment procedures to 
accommodate industrial accidents caused by earthquakes and floods using equipment damage models 
available in the literature. The damage model of horizontal cylindrical vessels in case of floods has been 
developed by Landducci et al. (2014). Khakzad and van Gelder (2018) used Bayesian network 
modelling to fragility assessment of industrial plants exposed to floods. There are also a number of 
studies that investigate accident databases to explore both the potential of natural hazards in causing 
Natechs and the characteristics and damage state of affected units; among others is work of Cozzani et 
al. (2014) and El Hajj et al. (2015), both in the context of flood-induced Natechs. Nevertheless, the 
methodologies for risk analysis of Natechs triggered by climatic severe conditions such as freezing 
(Table 1) are very limited, to the best knowledge of authors. 
2.4. Domino effects 
A domino effect also known as cascading events or knock-on accidents is referred to a chain of accidents 
where physical effects of a primary accident such as the blast wave of an explosion, heat radiation of 
fire, or fragments projected due to a vessel explosion trigger secondary accidents in nearby units 
(Reniers and Cozzani, 2013). These physical effects are also known as escalation vectors. Process plants 
due to high complexity and interdependencies of units containing hazardous materials usually at high-
temperature and high-pressure conditions have the potential to be affected by catastrophic domino 
effects due to an engineering accident or a Natech. 
Past accidents analysis indicates that accidental scenarios in the presence of a relevant domino effect 
share three features (Salzano and Cozzani, 2012): a) there is a primary accident which initiates the 
domino accidental sequence. In this paper, the primary event is considered to be a freeze-induced 
Natech; b) there is at least one secondary unit/equipment which is damaged due to the physical effects 
of the primary incident; c) due to damage of secondary unit/equipment, one or more secondary events 
such as fire, explosion, or toxic dispersion occur. 
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A number of factors contribute to the probability of accident propagation or escalation probability. More 
important factors include: a) the distance between the primary and secondary units, b) the type and 
storage of chemicals involved, and c) the vulnerability of the secondary units to the exposure of a 
primary event. In addition, it is usually assumed that for a secondary unit to be impacted by the 
escalation vector of a primary unit, the escalation vector intensity at the location of the secondary unit 
should be higher than a corresponding threshold value (Cozzani et al., 2006). Probit models are widely 
used for calculation of escalation probabilities in a wide variety of accident scenarios involving units 
with different vulnerabilities and with different escalation vectors. The type of process units, for 
example pressurized or atmospheric, and the type of escalation vector threatening the secondary units, 
for example overpressure or heat radiation, play important roles in calculation of probit values. A probit 
value Y can be defined as follows: 
𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ ln⁡(𝐷)                                                                     (1) 
where a and b represent probit coefficients, and D is either the escalation vector intensity received by 
or relevant parameters such as ttf (time to failure) of the secondary unit/equipment. Table 2 presents 
some probit models that are used for vulnerability analysis of process equipment exposed to heat 
radiation. As can be seen, the probit value Y is calculated based on ttf (s) of the secondary unit, the heat 
radiation Q (kW/m2) received by target unit, and the volume V (m3) of the secondary unit. After that, 
the escalation probability can be estimated based on the cumulative density function of the standard 
normal distribution Φ as: 
𝑃𝐸 = Φ(𝑌 − 5)                                                                       (2) 
Table 2. Probit models for heat radiation (Cozzani et al., 2005). 
Escalation vector  
Type of secondary 
equipment 
Probit model 
Heat radiation Atmospheric 𝑌 = 12.54 − 1.847 ln(𝑡𝑡𝑓) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ln(𝑡𝑡𝑓) = −1.13 ln(𝑄) − 2.67 ∗ 10−5𝑉 + 9.9 
Heat radiation Pressurized  𝑌 = 12.54 − 1.847 ln(𝑡𝑡𝑓) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ln(𝑡𝑡𝑓) = −0.95 ln(𝑄) + 8.85𝑉0.032 
For spreadsheet applications, the escalation probability can alternatively be approximated as: 
𝑃𝐸 = 50 {1 +
𝑌−5
|𝑌−5|
𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
|𝑌−5|
√2
)}                                                            (3) 
where erf is the error function. 
2.5. Bayesian networks 
A Bayesian network (BN) is a directed acyclic graph whose nodes represent random variables, and the 
arcs between nodes represent dependencies or direct causal influences thereof. The conditional 
probabilities (also known as parameters of BN which are represented within Conditional Probability 
Tables (CPTs)) assigned to the nodes determine the type and strength of the causal relationships among 
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the nodes. Each node in the BN has a set of collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive states with 
a probability distribution conditional on the states of its parent nodes, or an unconditional probability 
distribution if the node does not have any parents. The conditional and unconditional probabilities can 
be learned from available data or elicited from domain experts. Based on the conditional independence 
resulting from the d-separation concept, and using the chain rule, BN represents the joint probability 
distribution 𝑃(𝑋) of the random variables 𝑋 = {𝑋1, 𝑋2… ,𝑋𝑛} included in the network as (Neapolitan, 
2004): 
𝑃(𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛) =∏𝑃(𝑋𝑖|𝑝𝑎(𝑋𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(4) 
where 𝑝𝑎(𝑋𝑖) is the parent set of 𝑋𝑖 for  𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛. If 𝑝𝑎(𝑋𝑖) is an empty set, then 𝑋𝑖 is a root node 
and 𝑃(𝑋𝑖|𝑝𝑎(𝑋𝑖)) = 𝑃(𝑋𝑖). BN uses Bayes theorem to update the prior probability of random variables 
given new information E (Naderpour et al., 2014b):  
𝑃(𝑋|𝐸) =
𝑃(𝑋)𝑃(𝐸|𝑋)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋)𝑃(𝐸|𝑋)𝑋
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5) 
E, which is also called evidence, can be in form of equipment malfunction, system failure, or the 
variation of influential parameters such as temperature, pressure, or flow during system operation 
(Naderpour et al., 2014a). 
3. Natech risk analysis methodology 
This section presents the proposed methodology for the Natechs risk assessment. To develop the 
methodology, a frequency assessment is required to estimate the likelihood of the natural event (e.g., 
flash flood) and to identify its parameters (e.g., flow velocity) contributing to the failure of impacted 
equipment. In addition, to have a comprehensive modelling, the consequences of the primary Natech 
event along with potentially subsequent domino effects need to be assessed. The proposed methodology 
as summarized in Figure 1 is described in the following steps:  
Step 1:  Determine the unit(s) of study, the focus is on the units that include the process vessels with 
credible amounts of hazardous materials.  
Step 2:  Identify the possible natural hazards at the geographical location of the intended facility. Table 
1 provides a list of natural hazards that can be used as a reference at this step. 
Step 3:  For each possible natural hazard, present the influential parameters as nodes in the BN model. 
For each possible natural hazard, the following steps should be repeated. 
Step 4:  The target equipment in the environment is identified. The focus is on equipment with the 
potential of causing damage to human, assets, and the environment if impacted by the natural 
hazard. For each equipment, a node is created in the BN model with two states: safe and 
damaged. 
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Step 5:  Identify the possible Natech scenarios while considering the natural hazard and possible 
damage to the equipment. For instance, in case of submersion of the storage tanks during 
floods, their floatation and consequent release of chemical contents should be considered as a 
scenario.  
Step 6:  Select one Natech and introduce a corresponding node in the BN model with two states: 
happening and not happening. The following steps should be completed for each Natech. 
Step 7:  Assess the frequency of the Natech by connecting the natural hazard node and the equipment 
node to the Natech node; the CPT of this node is similar to a logical AND gate.  
Step 8:  A consequence node is added to the BN model. The states of the consequence node are 
determined using event trees (ETs). For example, Figure 2 shows an ET for liquid release 
from a pipe with different consequences. An arc is drawn from Natech node to the 
consequence node.  
Fig 2. Event tree for pipe release (Adopted from Ramírez-Camacho et al. (2016)). 
 
Step 9:  If there are any safety barriers in place to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the severity of 
Natech, each of them is represented by a node having two states, success and failure of the 
safety barrier. There are arcs between the nodes of safety barriers and the consequence node 
and also among the safety barriers themselves if their performance or failure probabilities 
depend on each other. The CPTs of the consequence node and the safety barrier nodes are 
completed according to the corresponding ET. 
Step 10:  According to layout of the process plant, critical units adjacent to the primary units (i.e., units 
which are more vulnerable to the natural event) are determined. Critical units usually refer to 
units with relevant inventories of flammable or explosive substances which have the potential 
to cause credible on-site or off-site damages. These units have potential to facilitate the 
propagation of primary Natech or an ongoing domino effect. These units are presented as 
nodes of the BN with two states: safe and accident. 
 
Jet fire1 
Jet fire, pool fire2 
Explosion + jet fire1 
Explosion + pool fire2 
Flash fire + jet fire1 
Flash fire + jet/pool fire2 
Environmental pollution 
Accident scenario 
Flame front 
acceleration 
Delayed ignition 
Immediate 
ignition 
Yes 
Yes 
No No 
Yes 
No 
Note: 
1 Flammable gases. 
2 Flammable and volatile liquid materials. 
Pipe release 
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Fig 1. Natech risk analysis methodology. 
Calculate the Natech risk 
Calculate escalation vectors 
Estimate escalation 
probabilities using probit 
functions 
Select units with high 
escalation probabilities as 
nodes of BN and the 
corresponding escalation 
vectors as arcs of BN 
Calculate the probability of 
events 
Determine the unit(s) 
Identify the possible natural 
hazard(s) 
Assess the frequency of 
Natech  
Determine the consequence of 
Natech, one node in BN 
Determine the adjacent 
critical units as nodes of BN 
Is there any 
adjacent unit? 
Termination 
No 
1 2 
7 
8 
17 
10 
11 
13 
14 
16 
Determine safety barriers as 
nodes in BN 
9 
Identify accident scenarios 
15 
Maintain escalation vectors 
greater than threshold values 
12 
Are there other 
units? 
Yes 
No 
List the possible Natechs 
5 
Select a Natech and create a 
node in BN 
6 
Yes 
Is there any 
Natech? 
  
No 
Yes 
Select a natural hazard, and 
create influential nodes in BN 
3 
Is there any 
natural 
hazard? 
No 
Yes 
Determine the equipment 
failures, and create nodes in 
BN 
4 
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Step 11:  Escalation vectors between the primary unit(s) affected by the natural event and the units 
identified in Step 10 (i.e., target units) are determined. Methods to calculate the intensity of 
escalation vectors can be found in (CCPS, 2000). 
Step 12:  Considering the predefined threshold values (e.g. Table 5 shows the threshold values for jet 
fire scenarios), escalation vectors which exceed the respective threshold will be considered in 
the modelling by drawing arcs from the primary unit(s) to the target units and so on. 
Step 13:  Probit functions can be used to estimate the damage probability (escalation probability) of 
target units.  
Step 14:  Among affected target units, those with the highest escalation probabilities are selected as 
secondary units. The secondary events are caused by the Natech; therefore, an arc is directed 
from the consequence node of the Natech to the secondary target unit(s).  
Step 15:  Potential accident scenarios considering the type of equipment, the type of substance released, 
and the type of damage (e.g., catastrophic rupture, vessel collapse, large breach on the shell, 
and pipe leakage) and their occurrence probabilities considering this fact that they have been 
damaged by the secondary events are specified.  
Step 16:  Considering Steps 10 to 14 for all the possible scenarios, the propagation pattern of the 
domino effect for the intended Natech can be developed in the BN. Therefore, the probabilities 
of the primary and secondary events can be calculated and the joint probability distribution of 
the events constituting the Natech-driven domino effect can be derived. 
Step 17:  If there is no domino effect, the Natech risk is calculated as the product of the probability and 
the severity of the consequences due to the Natech and the subsequent failure of the 
equipment. If there is a domino effect, the risk value includes the corresponding losses 
resulted from the domino effect as well. If there is more than one Natech, the methodology is 
repeated from Step 6, and if there is possibility of more natural hazards striking the industrial 
plant, the methodology restarts from Step 3.  
4. Application 
The application of the proposed methodology is demonstrated to the Natech at Valero refinery, Sunray, 
Texas in 2007.  
4.1. Propane de-asphalting unit 
The purpose of the PDA unit was to recover fuel feedstock and paving-grade asphalt that were produced 
in the refinery.  The PDA unit included two liquid extraction towers (hereafter, extractors) that used 
liquid propane as a solvent to extract gas oil from the pitch under an approximate pressure of 500 psi. 
The recovered gas oil (de-asphalted gas oil) was transmitted to another unit within the refinery to be 
processed into gasoline and the produced asphalt was sold to other companies to be used in paving 
materials. 
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Figure 3 shows the process flow diagram for Extractor 1, including the failure location due to freezing. 
The dense pitch enters the upper section of the extractor and flows to the bottom. Less dense liquid 
propane enters the extractor from a lower section and flows to the top. De-asphalted gas oil is extracted 
from the pitch and flows out of the extractor with much of the propane, which later be separated using 
a series of flash drums. There is another outflow from the bottom of the extractor that contains a mixture 
of asphalt and propane. This outflow is also heated and flashed to remove entrained propane from the 
asphalt. At various flashing steps, propane is extracted and transmitted to a low- and a high-pressure 
accumulators to be recycled to the extractors. However, a small amount of propane which accounts for 
about 0.5% of the circulating propane rate enters the low-pressure accumulator to replace losses. This 
makeup propane contains a variable amount of entrained water, which is regularly drained from the low 
points of the accumulator (CSB, 2008). During the days before the accident, water-contained makeup 
propane accumulated in a dead-leg due to a leaking gate valve, as depicted in Figure 4.   
 
Fig 3. Extractor 1 flow diagram (CSB, 2008). 
 
Fig 4.  Control station flow diagram (CSB, 2008). The piping on left-hand side of the control station 
was out-of-service, forming a dead-leg. 
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4.2. Events timeline 
According to US National Weather Service, Texas typically experiences some periods of below-
freezing weather during the winter time which often happen in February. In 2007, the freezing 
temperature began on February 12th for 87 hours.  Even a temperature of -15°C was recorded early in 
the morning of February 15th. The extended period of freezing weather and the lack of freeze protection 
on the control station in Extractor 1 allowed the water content of the accumulated propane to freeze, 
cracking the elbow pipe upstream of the control valve (see Figure 4). On February16th, the frozen water 
inside the cracked elbow, which would have prevented propane from leaking out the crack by then, 
began to thaw due to rising weather temperature, leading to a release of liquid propane at a pressure of 
500 psi. The generated vapour cloud was ignited a few minutes later, causing a series of massive fire. 
Unfortunately, the manual shut-off valves and pump on-off switches that could have been used to 
control the propane discharge were not accessible due to the size and intensity of the fire. Within 
minutes, the fire damaged piping and pipe rack supports, spreading further. As a result,  the plant was 
totally evacuated (CSB, 2008). 
4.3. Near-miss events 
In this accident, there have been two extraordinary near-miss events that could have dramatically 
exacerbated the consequences of the accident. Near-misses resulted from the exposure of nearby 
equipment to heat radiation. If the wind direction had been different or if the personnel had been nearby, 
one of the worst industrial disasters in recent US history would have been witnessed (CSB, 2008). The 
first near miss was the exposure of four large (10,000-barrel capacity) butane storage spheres to the fire 
at PDA; radiant heat from the intense PDA fire blistered the paint on the closest butane storage sphere 
located 82 m northwest of Extractor 1 as shown in Figure 5. Fortunately, the wind moved the flames 
away from the butane storage. Even with the existence of favourable wind, fire fighters did not manage 
to reach the water deluge system valve which was designed to provide a flow of water over the sphere 
surface to prevent it from heating. As for the second near miss, three one-ton chlorine containers which 
were used for the cooling tower water treatment were subjected to radiant heat from the PDA unit. One 
container vented through its melted fusible plug that was installed to prevent the container rupture. The 
second container ruptured despite the operation of its fusible plug; the third one developed a leak 
through a partially melted plug.  As a result, more than 2.5 tons of chlorine were released. Emergency 
responders and other refinery personnel had evacuated the area before the major chlorine release 
occurred. There is no evidence that personnel on- or off-site were exposed to hazardous levels of 
chlorine gas. However, if responders had been nearby when the cylinders released their contents, 
significant exposures could have occurred (CSB, 2008). 
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Fig 5. Aerial picture of the PDA unit after fire (CSB, 2008). 
 
4.4. Natech domino effect modelling and risk analysis  
Figure 6 shows Extractor 1 and surrounding units that are considered in this analysis. The characteristics 
of the units are summarized in Table 3. It is worth noting that in the present study, the chlorine release 
is not considered as an escalation vector in domino effect analysis since it does not result directly in a 
loss of containment or damaging of other equipment. However, it needs to be taken into consideration 
for risk analysis due to its great potential to harm people and the environment. In addition, the non-
fireproofed supported pipeline needs to be taken into account as its failure caused pipelines containing 
flammable materials to collapse, contributing further to the chain of accidents. For the sake of 
simplicity, all pipes involved are considered as one single pipe.  
Table 3. Unit characteristics. 
Unit Symbol Type Substance Content (m3) 
Extractors  EX1, EX2 Pressurized Propane 5.7 
Butane spheres  BS1-BS4 Pressurized Butane 1590 
Naphtha column NC Atmospheric Naphtha 7 
Chlorine containers CC Pressurized Chlorine 312 
Supported pipeline SP - - - 
 
 
Page 14 of 22 
 
Fig 6. Extractor 1 (EX1) and surrounding units. The likely propagation of domino effect scenario, 
starting from EX1, has been presented in form of a BN. 
4.4.1. Natech modelling 
To simplify the application of the proposed methodology, only freezing weather is considered as the 
natural hazard in the intended environment. In addition, the focus is on the dead-leg that caused the 
accident. To conduct Steps 1 to 9 of the proposed methodology, a preliminary BN with eight nodes is 
developed in Figure 7. The nodes, their states, and relevant probabilities are reported in Table 4. 
The weather temperature is considered as a node in the BN with two states: freezing and normal. The 
freezing probability for the intended area was estimated as 0.09 per year based on 10 years records at 
the US National Weather Service (www.weather.gov). The dead-leg of interest is represented as another 
node of the BN. This node has two states: safe and damaged due to freezing weather conditions. The 
failure probability of the dead-leg due to freezing is determined based on experimental results by 
Fleming and Lydell (2004), while other hardware failure probabilities were determined based on data 
available in the Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (OREDA, 2002). The states of the consequence 
node were identified as the Jet fire, Environmental pollution, and Safe. According to the CSB report, 
there was no safety barrier in the intended unit to prevent a freeze-triggered accident. In addition, there 
were safety barriers including manual isolation valve, and fire water monitors in place to reduce the 
severity of possible accidents, however; due to the fire extent they were damaged or impossible to be 
activated.  
 
 
 
 
EX2 
NC 
BS1 
BS2 
BS3 
BS4 
CC 
SP 
EX1 
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Table 4. The preliminary BN nodes and characteristics in Figure 7. 
Node States Symbol 
Probability/Failure 
Probability 
Weather temperature Freezing, Normal WT 9.00E-02 
Accumulation of water Yes, No AW 3.00E-03 
Pipe failure Safe, Damaged PF 1.00E-02 
Ignition Safe, Spark IG 1.00E-01 
Natech Happening, Not happening NT NA 
Consequence Jet Fire, Environmental Pollution, Safe CO NA 
Isolation valve Success, Failure IV 1.40E–01 
Fire water monitor Success, Failure FM 1.30E–02 
Fig 7. The preliminary BN to represent Steps 1 to 9. 
4.4.2. Accident escalation modelling  
The preliminary BN is extended by adding nodes for surrounding credible units (Step 10). Considering 
jet fire scenario in EX1, direct fire impingement and heat radiation are taken into account. The 
escalation threshold values for heat radiation and fire impingement for atmospheric and pressure units 
are listed in Table 5 (Cozzani et al., 2006).  
Table 5. Escalation thresholds for jet fire scenario (Cozzani et al., 2006). 
Scenario  
Escalation 
vector 
Modality 
Target 
category 
Escalation criteria Safety distance 
Jet fire  
 
Heat radiation Fire impingement  All  
 
Escalation always 
possible 
- 
  Stationary radiation Atmospheric Q >15kW/m2 50m from flame 
envelope 
   Pressurized Q >40kW/m2 25m from flame 
envelope 
 
To determine the possible secondary units, the intensity of heat radiation received by EX2, SP, NC, and 
BS1 in the case of a jet fire at EX1 are calculated by ALOHA software1 (Step 11). The following input 
data was used in ALOHA to calculate the magnitude of heat radiation at different locations: a wind 
speed of 10 m/s measured at 3 m above the ground and gusting from the north east; air temperature of 
10°C; relative humidity of 50%, a clear sky, and stability class of D. In addition, the diameter and the 
pressure of the pipe is roughly considered as 254 mm and 50 psia. 
                                                     
1 www.epa.gov/cameo/aloha-software 
WT 
PF 
NT CO 
IG 
IV 
FM 
AW 
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The potential secondary units are SP and EX2 due to fire impingement and the heat radiation intensity 
of 49.9 kW/m2, respectively (Step 12). The escalation probabilities are calculated by probit functions 
(Step 13). Accordingly, the causal arcs in the corresponding BN are directed from the node CO to the 
nodes SP and EX2 as shown in Figure 8 (Step 14). The CPT of these nodes given jet fire in EX1 is 
formed using calculated escalation probabilities. For example, Table 6 shows the CPT of EX2.  
Table 6. The CPT of EX2. 
 CO   
EX2 Jet Fire Environmental Pollution Safe 
Accident 0.9829 0 0 
Safe 0.0171 1 1 
    
Given that the secondary units have been damaged, potential accident scenarios and their occurrence 
probabilities are specified. In this case, catastrophic rupture of EX2 and collapse of SP are determined 
as the damage states of these two units (Step 15). Substituting the secondary units for the primary unit, 
Steps 11 to 15 are repeated to determine potential tertiary units, and so forth. It is worth noting that 
when repeating the same procedure for either the secondary units or higher-order units, synergistic 
effects should be considered (Khakzad et al., 2013). For example, EX1, EX2, and SP can cooperate 
with each other to trigger an accident in NC as the total heat radiation intensity produced is 19.17 kW/m2 
which is higher than the threshold value. Therefore, causal arcs are directed from CO (i.e. the 
consequence node of EX1), EX2, and SP to NC showing the conditional dependency of the latter on 
the former units. The synergistic impact of EX1, EX2, and SP on BS1 is 11.64 kW/m2, which is less 
than the threshold value. Similarly, the cooperation of EX1, EX2, SP, and NC on BS1 is 13.56 kW/m2. 
Therefore, the total produced heat radiation from primary, secondary, and tertiary events is not sufficient 
to affect butane spheres. The abovementioned modelling is reflected in Figure 8. 
 
Fig 8. The BN model for propagation pattern. 
4.4.3. Domino probability 
The probability of the domino effect is estimated at different levels by the developed BN. Generally, 
the probability of the domino effect (𝑃𝐷) is calculated as the multiplication of the probability of the 
EX2 
SP 
NC 
CC 
WT 
PF 
NT CO 
IG 
IV 
FM 
AW 
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primary event (𝑃𝑃) and the conditional escalation probabilities of the impacted units (𝑃𝐸) (Khakzad et 
al., 2013): 
𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑃𝐸 ⁡                                                              (6) 
The domino effect at the first level is calculated by assuming that the primary jet fire damages at least 
one of the nearby units, i.e., EX2 or SP. Therefore, the probability of the first-level domino effect is 
represented as: 
𝑃𝐿1 = 𝑃(𝐶𝑂) ∗ 𝑃(𝐸𝑋2 ∪ 𝑆𝑃|𝐶𝑂)     (7) 
The domino effect propagates to the second level when at least a tertiary unit, i.e., NC, is impacted by 
the first-level domino accidents. Therefore, the probability of the second-level domino effect is as 
follows: 
𝑃𝐿2 = 𝑃(𝐶𝑂) ∗ 𝑃(𝐸𝑋2 ∪ 𝑆𝑃|𝐶𝑂) ∗ 𝑃(𝑁𝐶|𝐶𝑂, 𝐸𝑋2, 𝑆𝑃)                   (8) 
To facilitate the modelling, an auxiliary node called A1 with two states accident and safe is added to 
the BN model to represent 𝐴1 = ⁡𝐸𝑋2 ∪ 𝑆𝑃 (see Figure 9). Two corresponding arcs from EX2 and SP 
are connected to A1 and the CPT of A1 is filled up considering an OR gate. Likewise, two other 
auxiliary nodes called L1 and L2 with two states accident and safe are added to the BN to calculate the 
probabilities of levels 1 and 2 of the domino effect.  
Fig 9. The complete BN model for estimating the domino effect probabilities. 
4.4.4. Natech risk assessment 
The BN model is analysed by Hugin researcher package 8.51. The accident probabilities and the 
probability of the domino effect at sequential levels are listed in Table 7. Second column shows the 
prior probabilities before setting any evidence in the BN model. Considering the presence of freezing 
weather, pipe failure, and safety barriers failure in accordance with CSB report, the posterior 
probabilities are updated as shown in the third column of Table 7 (Step 16). 
 
                                                     
1 www.hugin.com 
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Table 7. Domino effect probabilities. 
Node Prior probability  Posterior probability* Damage given the accident 
NA 2.70E-06 1.00 - 
EX1 9.00E-06 1.00 1E+07 
EX2 8.82E-06 0.98 1E+07 
CC 8.10E-06 0.90 8E+06 
SP 8.91E-06 0.99 5E+06 
NC 5.76E-06 0.64 7E+06 
L1 8.99E-06 0.99 - 
L2 5.76E-06 0.65 - 
* Posterior probability given pipe failure due to freezing weather and failure of safety barriers in 
accordance with CSB report. 
Note: The probability of EX1 is equal to the probability of jet fire state in the CO node. 
For any given accident, a total loss in a common currency in which human, asset, and the environmental 
losses are converted to money, is provided. Therefore, a risk value associated with the freeze-triggered 
Natech can be estimated. Last column in Table 7 for example shows estimated damages for each unit. 
The risk of the Natech is then calculated as $36,430,000 (Step 17). This risk calculation can benefit 
risk-based decision making or risk-reducing strategies to be conducted or implemented.  
As the BN is able to take new information into account to update the prior probabilities, the posterior 
probability of the events and also the most probable configuration of events leading to the evidence can 
be calculated (Khakzad et al., 2013). The probability updating can be conducted given that EX2 has 
been in safe condition in accordance with CSB report. The posteriors are summarized in Table 8. 
Table 8. Domino effect posterior probabilities given that EX2 has been in safe state. 
Unit Posterior probability 
EX1 1 
EX2 0 
CC 0.90 
SP 0.99 
NC 0 
L1 0.99 
L2 0 
Considering the most probable configuration, it can be seen that the domino effect has proceeded to the 
first level without passing through the second level, resulting in no escalation of NC. 
4.4.5. Sensitivity analysis 
To ensure the BN model demonstrates acceptable behavior, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. The 
sensitivity analysis systematically investigates the influence of variation in the model inputs on the 
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model’s outputs, where inputs can be the BN parameters (i.e., conditional probabilities) or evidence 
(i.e. information about the states of nodes) (Bednarski et al., 2004).  Using sensitivity analysis, it is 
possible to determine whether a variable is sensitive or insensitive to the changes in other variables in 
particular contexts. 
In this paper, the GeNIe software1 which supports one-dimensional sensitivity analysis is utilized. The 
results are presented as bar charts in Figure 10 which show the most sensitive nodes for NA, L1, and 
L2 in the happening and accident states in the absence of evidence. The red/green bars show the positive 
derivative values and the green/red bars represent the negative derivatives. NA is most sensitive to WT, 
followed by AW. L1 and L2 are most sensitive to FM, followed by IW. As can be seen, after making a 
small change (i.e. 10% of current value), the posterior output changes are not significant, therefore the 
network structure and the prior probability values seem fine. When the evidence of WT=freezing and 
later PF=damaged and the safety barrier failures are entered into the network, the sensitivity measures 
and the ranking of variables are changed. However, the posterior probabilities show normal behavior.  
 
 
 
                                                     
1 www.bayesfusion.com 
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Fig 10. Sensitivity analysis results for NA, L1, and L2 (Parameter spread=10% of current value). 
5. Conclusions  
Natural hazards (such as extreme weather conditions) in conjunction with seemingly insignificant 
equipment malfunctions (such as failure-to-close of a gate valve) can result in catastrophic natural-
technological (Natech) accidents. It is further possible that the consequences of such Natech accidents 
in chemical plants become much more severe due to the escalation of accidents exacerbated by failure 
or unavailability of safety barriers resulting domino effects. This paper develops a new methodology to 
assess the risk of Natechs considering their possible domino effects. The proposed methodology is 
relied upon Bayesian network capabilities to graphically represent the Natech domino effect modelling 
and to capture the uncertainties involved.  
The methodology is applied to investigate the accident at Valero refinery in 2007 in Texas, USA that 
was triggered by severe weather. The accident initiated in a de-asphalting unit in which the freezing of 
undesirably accumulated water in a control station’s dead-leg caused the piping to crack, releasing 
pressurized liquid propane and leading to massive fire. The accident could have resulted in much more 
severe consequences due to the possibility of initiating a catastrophic domino effect; a naphtha column, 
three chlorine containers, and four enormous butane storage spheres were seriously exposed to the 
primary fire. The modelling of Valero refinery major accident and near misses points out the need for 
consideration of quantitative risk analysis of Natech domino effects in chemical plants. 
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